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VICTIMS' VOICES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
QUANDARIES: LIFE AFTER PAYNE v.
TENNESSEE
CAIT CLARKE* & THOMAS BLOCK**
As some day it may happen that a victim must be found, I've
got a little list-I've got a little list. Of society offenders who
might well be underground, And who never would be
missed-who never would be missed.1
Few issues have stirred such emotionally charged debates as the
death penalty and its connection to victims' rights. An escalation
of violent crimes and overwhelming frustration with the judicial
system have forced a diverse spectrum of American people to de-
mand a change in both the state and federal criminal justice sys-
tems. Some believe that changes have not been swift enough, nor
have the courts and legislatures been sensitive to the needs of
victims.
The following dialogue between a law student and his profes-
sor' focuses upon some of the central issues regarding the admissi-
bility of victim impact statements in capital sentencing cases. This
dialogue will explore the relevant constitutional concerns and per-
sonal reflections upon the criminal justice process. This debate
does not offer a panacea, but is intended to provide a personal,
introspective examination of the words and effect of United States
Supreme Court decisions in this area. Moreover, the debate will
focus on the State of Louisiana's struggle to protect a defendant's
constitutional rights in the most serious of all cases, capital sen-
* Associate Professor, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans. J.D. Catholic
University of America; LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center.
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Professor Clarke; Mr. Block. The authors wish to extend their most sincere gratitude to
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tencing cases, while at the same time protect and further victims'
rights within the criminal justice system.
In New Orleans, a city where 490,000 people live and work, there
were 345 homicides during 1991.P My wife Beth was one of them. On
August 28, 1991, at approximately 9:00 P.M., three young robbers ap-
proached us on bicycles as we were leaving our apartment. One of them,
Melvin Green, a twenty year old, pulled a gun and told us to "give it
up. " Seconds later Beth ran for our car. Scared and fleeing for protec-
tion, she tried to lock herself inside. Through the car window, Green shot
her once in the neck with a .357 magnum as she cowered inside the car.
Beth died in my arms, never regaining consciousness. She was only 24
years old. Though we had been in love for seven years, we had been
married only ten weeks. Melvin Green took from me the most important
part of my life that night; he took my future and that of the woman I
loved. With that single gunshot many lives were forever changed, if not
destroyed. Today, two of the men have been tried and convicted; the third
may not be prosecuted for lack of evidence.
On July 21, 1992, almost one year after shooting my wife, Green was
brought to trial on a first degree murder charge. The State sought the
death penalty. In a bifurcated capital punishment trial, the jury con-
victed Green offirst degree murder. At the sentencing phase, the jury did
not sentence Green to death. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with-
out the opportunity for parole. In October of 1992, the second robber
was tried for second degree murder under the Louisiana felony-murder
doctrine. The jury convicted him of manslaughter.
I. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
Victim impact statements (VIS) are written or oral testimony in-
troduced by the prosecution describing the effect of the crime
upon the victim or her family including suffering, economic loss,
medical expenses, physical impairment, and any other relevant in-
formation at the sentencing phase.4 The admissibility of VIS often
Statistics provided by the New Orleans Police Department, Public Information Officer.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844 (West 1992). The statute states in pertinent
part:
A. All judicial and law enforcement agencies shall provide the following services to
victims, as specified: ...
(9) Before disposition or sentencing in any case where a defendant has been
charged with or found guilty of a felony, the court shall notify the victim of the time
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depends on whether the statements are proffered in a felony or
capital sentencing case. The underlying constitutional claim raised
in these capital sentencing cases is the Eighth Amendment pro-
scription of cruel and unusual punishment."
All victim impact statements were excluded from Melvin Green's capi-
tal sentencing trial. During this "process" that began the night of Au-
gust 28, 1991, 1 find that I have worn three hats-that of a law stu-
dent, eyewitness, and victim. As a law student, I understand and
acknowledge the necessity of a system in which certain protections attach
to persons so that no arbitrary action may deny them their rights. I also
understand that it was essential that the defendant be protected by the
mantle of our Constitution. It was clear to me then and it still is today.
As an eyewitness, however, I continually grapple with the nightmare of
that night. The memory alone is something that most people can never
begin to comprehend. The most frustrating role has been that of a victim
because I have been left with many unanswered questions. I came to
know a system which all but locked the victim out of the proceedings. It
was the State of Louisiana against Melvin Green, but the State of Louisi-
ana had not been murdered by Melvin Green, Beth had. The procedural
safeguards in place for the defendant never took into account the
thoughts of the victim or her immediate surviving family members. In the
midst of this constitutional quandary, the Supreme Court of the United
States allowed the states to decide when capital sentencing juries may
hear the victims' voices.6
and place of sentencing and of the victim's right to make a victim's impact state-
ment. The victim's impact statement may be made orally or in writing by the victim,
the victim's family, the district attorney, or any or all of them. It shall be filed with
the court and shall include the following:
(a) The name of the victim.
(b) Documentation of the net financial loss resulting from the crime.
(c) A statement of psychological impact on the victim's personal welfare or family
relationships.
C. The family members of all homicide victims shall be afforded all of the rights
under this Section accruing to victims.
Id. See also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(B) (West 1992) (VIS must include any mone-
tary loss, medical expenses, physical impairment any other relevant information).
' See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that in comporting with societal stan-
dards of decency there must not be excessive infliction of pain nor must the penalty be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Id. at 173.
' See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (holding states may determine
admissibility of VIS evidence in capital sentencing cases).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed the ad-
missibility of victim impact statements three times within the past
five years.' In Booth v. Maryland,' the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder for the slaying of an elderly couple. In the
sentencing phase of the capital case, the prosecution read to the
jury a written VIS prepared by the State Division of Parole and
Probation based on interviews with the victims' son, daughter,
son-in-law, and granddaughter.9
The VIS contained two types of information., The first type de-
scribed "the personal characteristics of the victims and the emo-
tional impact of the crimes on the family." 10 The VIS "empha-
sized the victims' outstanding personal qualities, and noted how
deeply the [victims] would be missed.""1 Also included were those
statements that explored the emotional damage experienced by
the surviving family members, such as sleep disorders, depression,
fear and mental anguish haunting the survivors' daily lives, and
the need for professional counseling. 2 The second type of VIS
introduced in Booth focused on "the family members' opinions
and characterizations of the crimes and the defendant."1
The Supreme Court concluded that both types of VIS were "ir-
relevant to a capital sentencing decision, and that its admission
Id. (Eighth Amendment does not, per se, prohibit capital sentencing jury from consid-
ering victim impact evidence), overruling South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12
(1989) (prosecutor's reading of religious tract that murder victim was carrying into record
at sentencing, and comments on victim's personal qualities inferred from victim's posses-
sion of religious tract and voter registration card held grounds for reversal of death pen-
alty) and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987) (concluding "that the introduction
of a VIS at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth
Amendment").
8 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
' See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1987).
10 Id. at 502.
" Id. at 499 (footnote omitted). For example, the son described his parents as "amazing
people who attended the senior citizens' center and made many devout friends .... Their
funeral was the largest in the history of the Levinson Funeral Home and the family re-
ceived over one thousand sympathy cards .. ." Id. n.3.
11 Id. at 511. The son found his parents' bodies at 4:00 p.m. He stated that he is always
aware when 4:00 p.m. arrives and he wakes up at 4:00 a.m. every day. Id. Similarly, the
daughter stated that she could not bear to look at kitchen knives without the constant
reminder of the murder. Id. at 512-13.
1$ Id. at 502. For example, the victims' son "stated that his parents were 'butchered like
animals' and that he 'doesn't think that anyone should be able to do something like that
and get away with it.' " Id. at 500. The daughter stated that she " 'could never forgive
anyone for killing [her parents] that way.' " Id. She added that " 'animals wouldn't do this,
... that the people who did this could [n]ever be rehabilitated and [that] she doesn't want
them to be able to do this again or put another family through this.' " Id. at 513.
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create[d] a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury might
impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner."14 The Court stated that a jury must consider the defend-
ant's record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of the
crime in order to determine whether the defendant should re-
ceive the penalty of death for the murder conviction. 5 The Court
emphasized that the jury must focus on the defendant and his per-
sonal characteristics as a unique human being prior to imposing a
sentence of death. 6 The Court noted that VIS may impermissibly
shift the focus away from the defendant and onto the victim and
the victims' family.'
The Supreme Court considered this type of evidence irrelevant
to the defendant's blameworthiness, and expressed its disapproval
of punishing more harshly those defendants whose victims had a
greater relative worth within the community." Finally, the Court
noted how difficult it is to rebut VIS "without shifting the focus of
the sentencing hearing away from the defendant."20 For example,
it would be difficult to establish that the family members "exag-
gerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression or emotional
trauma suffered."' '1
The Court also held that the second type of VIS was inadmissi-
ble because it could only "inflame the jury" and unconstitutionally
divert the jury's attention away from "deciding the case based on
relevant evidence. '2 2 The Booth Court reasoned that courts could
not admit VIS at the sentencing phase because of the impermissi-
ble risk that the capital sentencing decisions might be made arbi-
" Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
" Id. at 502.
16 Id. at 504 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
" Id. The Booth Court reasoned that the evidence of the victims' characteristics and the
harm done to the victims' family is not probative of the defendant's blameworthiness,
which is the focus of the sentencing hearing. Id.
18 Id.
See Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05.
I d. at 506. The Court attempted to avoid a "mini-triil" on the victims' characters
which would shift the jury's attention away "from its constitutionally required
task-determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and
record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the crime." Id. at 507.
21 Id. at 506.
" Id. at 508. "The admission of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclu-
sions the jury should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned deci-
sionmaking we require in capital cases." Id. at 508-09 (footnote omitted).
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trarily. 3 The Court was concerned that the VIS might not be re-
lated to the defendant's blameworthiness and that the jury would
consider factors that were not relevant to the decision to kill. 4 At
the time of the killing, the defendant generally does not know the
victim nor any of her personal characteristics. 5 The Court rea-
soned that the victim's identity, and her relative "worth" in soci-
ety, were beyond the defendant's knowledge and control.2 ' The
defendant's "culpability depends not on fortuitous circumstances
such as the composition of his victim's family, but on circum-
stances over which he has control."" The sentencing jury must
consider relevant information about the defendant and the deci-
sion to kill, not on how well the surviving victims can articulate
their grief and their loss."8 More importantly, the inflammatory
nature and varied quality of this information "creates an imper-
missible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in
an arbitrary manner. "29 The Booth reasoning set guidelines re-
garding VIS admissibility to ensure that capital sentencing juries
adhere to the law, apply the facts presented, and avoid arbitrary
sentences.30 Nevertheless, the Booth Court indicated that VIS
might be admissible if it is related to the circumstances of the
crime. 1
Two years later, the Supreme Court extended Booth in South
Carolina v. Gathers.2 The Gathers Court held that VIS made by a
prosecutor at closing argument to a sentencing jury had to be ex-
cluded pursuant to Booth.3 The prosecutor could not draw infer-
13 Id. at 503.
" See Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
25 Id. at 504.
2 Id. at 506 n.8.
27 Id. at 504 n.7 (quoting People v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276, 287-88 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984)).
28 Id. at 505. The victims' ability or inability to express their grief and the "worth" of
the victim were held to be irrelevant to the jury's decision whether to impose a death
sentence or a life sentence. Id.
"9 Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
30 Id. at 502.
" Id.; see also id at 507 n. 10. In dicta, the Court noted that the event VIS's were related
to the circumstances of the crime, it would conceivably be allowed. Id. To impose a sen-
tence of death, the "jury must make an 'individualized determination' whether the defend-
ant in question should be executed, based on 'the character of the individual and the cir-
cumstances of the crime.'" Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879
(1983)).
2 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
"2 Id. at 807. In Gathers, the defendant and three other youths, killed a homeless, self-
proclaimed preacher. Id. The statement regarding the personal characteristics of the victim
[Vol. 8:35
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ences about the victim's character based on objects and papers3 4
found at the scene of the murder.85 The Gathers Court further
held that the prosecutor's comments were unnecessary to under-
stand the circumstances of the crime.
36
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the
Booth and Gathers holdings in Payne v. Tennessee.3 The defendant
was convicted, inter alia, of two counts of first degree murder of a
twenty-eight year old mother, Charisse, and her two-year old
daughter, Lacie.3 Nicholas, her three-year old son, survived the
attack. 9 At the sentencing phase Charisse's mother testified about
the effect of the murder upon Nicholas. 0 During closing argu-
in Gathers was indistinguishable from that type of statement introduced in Booth. Id. at 811.
" Id. at 807. In the course of the murder, the defendant rummaged through the victim's
belongings, including his voter registration card, two bibles, rosaries, plastic statues, and
religious tracts, apparently looking for items to steal. Id. The Court stated that the jury
should not be allowed to rely on information that "could result in imposing the death
sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrele-
vant to the decision to kill." Id. at 811. "Under these circumstances, the content of the
various papers the victim happened to be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortui-
tous and cannot provide any information relevant to the defendant's moral culpability." Id.
at 812.
Id. at 809. During closing arguments at the sentencing phase, the prosecutor re-
marked at length about the personal belongings of the victim present at the scene. Id. He
read from one of the religious tracts carried by the victim and drew inferences about the
victim's character from the items found in the victim's possession. Id. For example, he
inferred from the victim's voter registration card his commitment to the community. Id. at
810.
Although the prosecutor, and not the surviving family members introduced the victim's
personal characteristics, the Court found that the analysis turned on the content of the
statement and not the manner in which the statements were presented to the jury. Id. at
811. Arguably, based on the prosecutor's remarks the jury voted to impose the death pen-
alty. Id. at 810. On appeal, the state supreme court held that the prosecutor's remarks
regarding the victim's character and inferences drawn from the victim's belongings were
necessary to understand the circumstances of the crime, and were therefore inadmissible
under Booth. Id. at 811.
Id. at 812. On appeal before the United States Supreme Court, the government ar-
gued that the prosecutor's remarks were directly related to the circumstances of the crime
and therefore admissible. Id. at 811. The Court held that the prosecutor's statements that
the defendant threw the victim's belongings around the area were directly related to the
circumstances of the crime and therefore relevant to the defendant's blameworthiness. Id.
However, the Court objected to the prosecutor's extended commentary and inferences
drawn from the victim's personal belongings. Id. The Court stated that there was no evi-
dence that the defendant read any of the victim's personal papers, and thus the content of
the papers was not directly related to the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 811-12.
I' 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
I Id. at 2601.
89 Id.
0 Id. at 2603. The VIS included the following testimony: "He cries for his mom. He
doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie.
He comes to me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my
Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about my Lacie." Id.
19921
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ments at the sentencing, the prosecutor commented on the con-
tinuing effects of the crime on Nicholas's daily life, referred to the
atrocious and cruel nature of the crime, and speculated about the
lost future of the victims. 41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari42 to reconsider the
"holdings in Booth and Gathers that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibit[ed] a capital sentencing jury from considering 'victim im-
pact' evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim
and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family." 43
The Payne Court analyzed the rationale of Booth and concluded
that it was an incorrect interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
and should be overruled."
Since the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment
does not provide a per se bar to the introduction of VIS in the
sentencing phase of capital offense cases,'8 it is now an issue for
the states to decide whether to include victim impact evidence in
assessing the defendant's culpability in a capital sentencing case. 46
The Court expressly noted that its decision applied only to the
first type of evidence addressed in Booth (VIS relating to the vic-
tim and the impact on the family).4 7 The second type of VIS
(characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant,
and the appropriate sentence) are unchanged by the holding in
Payne."8 In the wake of this decision many states are exploring the
admissibility of VIS in capital cases in light of the Payne decision.49
41 Id. "[T]here won't be a high school principal to talk about Lacie Jo Christopher, and
there won't be anybody to take her to her high school prom. And there won't be anybody
there-there won't be her mother there or Nicholas's mother there to kiss him at night.
His mother will never kiss him good night or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him
and sing him a lullaby." Id.
42 111 S. Ct. 1031 (1991).
43 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2604. This was the first type of VIS discussed in Booth.
4 Id. at 2609.
6 Id. (holding Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to states permitting admission of
victim impact evidence and related prosecutorial argument on that subject).
11 Id. at 2608.
47 Id. at 2614-17 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter divides VIS into three catego-
ries: 1) information revealing the "individuality of the victim;" 2) the impact of the crime
on the victim's survivors; and 3) information concerning a victim's family members' charac-
terization of and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.
Id.
' Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2.
'" See infra text and accompanying notes 114-154.
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II. PARITY THROUGH PAYNE
Like many of you, I have participated in the criminal justice system as
part of my legal education. Few of you, however, have participated as a
witness, and fewer still (I hope) have participated as a victim. It is
largely in my role as victim that I hope to provide insight. In my opinion,
the issues raised in this essay and in this symposium should not be de-
bated in an academic vacuum. Just as the victim's voice must be heard in
court, it must necessarily be heard here. To some, my comments may be
inflammatory, but I do that purposely. Sometimes a person must scream
in order to be heard.
The Supreme Court in Payne at last recognized the relevance of the
impact on the victim in assessing the defendant's culpability. The deci-
sion also emphasized the distinction between the guilt and sentencing
phases of a bifurcated trial. The reader must always remember that, by
the time the sentencing phase of a trial is reached, twelve jurors have
found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. At the
sentencing phase, the defendant can no longer assert his innocence. In
determining the appropriate sentence for the defendant, the jury must
now consider the severity of the criminal act, its effect on society, and the
full consequences of the defendant's actions, which necessarily include
the harm done to the victim's family.50 As the majority in Payne ex-
plained, "two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of
different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of
harm. "51 Ultimately, Payne "levelfed] the playing field" and ensured
that the sentencing hearing applied equally to both the victim's and de-
fendant's interests. The following are the major arguments used by pro-
ponents of the Booth and Gathers decisions to exclude VIS.
A. Personalized Punishment
There are several traditional justifications for punishment, in-
cluding rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and incapacita-
tion. 5 The latter two justifications are the major theories underly-
ing the death penalty.53 "The relevance of a particular type of
80 See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. "A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about
the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the
jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed." Id.
Id. at 2605.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1975) (asserting that retribution, deter-
rence, and incapacitation are principal purposes of punishment).
" See id.
1992]
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evidence is determined, in part, by the reason for which society
seeks to punish.""4 Laws were enacted, and courts held prior to
Payne, that only select information, such as the defendant's prior
criminal history, his propensity to commit violent crimes, and the
circumstances of the crime, are relevant to determining a defend-
ant's blameworthiness as an individual member of society.55
An important goal of capital sentencing hearings is to provide a
comprehensive picture of the individual being sentenced and of
the individual's particular conduct in the criminal act."6 The sen-
tence of death must reflect an individualized determination of the
defendant's "personal responsibility and moral guilt. '5 Thus, the
sentencing phase must necessarily focus upon the defendant in or-
der for the jury to ascertain the extent of the defendant's culpa-
bility.58 Testimony and other evidence that diverts the jury's at-
tention away from the defendant as an individual and to the
victim and the victim's family risks denial of the defendant's due
process rights and raises other significant constitutional
quandaries.59
The admission of VIS does not divert the juror's attention away from
the crime and the defendant. There is no greater individualized determi-
nation than one which considers fully the loss or harm to society caused
by the guilty party's conduct. "[I]ndividualized consideration [is not]
consideration wholly apart from the crime which [the defendant] has
Christopher W. Ewing, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: The Demise of Booth v. Maryland,
23 PAC. L.J. 1389, 1431 (1992).
55 See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 905.4 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (listing aggravat-
ing circumstances).
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. "We have long recognized that '[flor determination of
sentences, justice generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances
of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.' " Id. (citations
omitted); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1975) (stating that "individual
sentencing determinations" mandate an analysis of defendant's character, his previous rec-
ord, and the surrounding circumstances of the crime).
"' Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987).
See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 ("A process that accords no significance to relevant fac-
ets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration . . . the possibility of mitigating factors.").
"' See Booth, 482 U.S. at 508 (indicating that presenting victim impact evidence by prose-
cution can only "inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant
evidence concerning the crime and the defendant."). But see id. at 516-17 (White, J., dis-
senting). "[I]f punishment can be enhanced in noncapital cases on the basis of the harm
caused, irrespective of the offender's specific intention to cause such harm, I fail to see why
the same approach is unconstitutional in death cases." Id.
[Vol. 8:35
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committed. " 6
" '[T]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating
evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sen-
tencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual,
so too the victim was an individual whose death represents a unique loss
to society and in particular to his family.' " 6 As the Payne Court ex-
plained, VIS reflect "each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human
being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the community resulting
from his death might be." 62
B. The Sentence of Death Must Not Be Imposed Arbitrarily
Constitutional limitations are imposed at the sentencing phase
to ensure that the defendant's sentence is based upon evidence of
his conduct and not upon arbitrary factors or the passion and
prejudice of the jury. The Supreme Court opinions in Booth and
Gathers have promoted knowing and informed decision-making by
capital sentencing juries.6 3 By prohibiting the admission of emo-
tionally charged VIS at the sentencing phase, the Court fostered
deliberate and careful construction of state capital sentencing stat-
utes rather than a visceral decision to sentence a defendant to
death.6"
The Supreme Court has stated that "[e]vidence about the vic-
tim and survivors can be so inflammatory as to risk a verdict im-
permissibly based on passion not deliberation. 6" Legislatures and
the judiciary require the jury to consider both mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances carefully and follow the statutory man-
dates. 6 This prevents juries from creating their own law regard-
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2587, 2607 (1991).
61 Id. at 2608 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
02 Id. at 2607.
63 See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05 (noting jury's attention is to be directed to "defend-
ant's background and record, and the circumstances of the crime"); South Carolina v.
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989) (" '[fqor purposes of imposing the death penalty . . .
[the defendant's] punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral
guilt.' ") (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
" See Booth, 482 U.S. at 508. "[Any decision to impose the death sentence must 'be, and
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.' " Id. (quoting Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
66 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976). "[I]t is within the realm of possibility
to point to the main circumstances or aggravation and of mitigation that should be
weighed and weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete case."
1992]
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ing what crimes are punishable by death on an ad hoc basis.6 ' The
law and statutes are a reflection of society's moral judgments; the
jury's duty is to enforce those moral judgments, not their own
personal decisions and interpretations of the law.
For example, the Excessiveness Clause of the Louisiana State
Constitution states that "[n]o law shall subject any person ...to
cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.""8 This constitutional
protection has been codified by Louisiana Supreme Court rules
mandating the exclusion of evidence that could inject passion,
prejudice or arbitrary factors into the jury's deliberative process. 69
VIS are intrinsically inflammatory.7 0 In order to protect a defend-
ant's due process rights, the jury must not be distracted nor base
their verdict on an emotional response.7
Therefore, by excluding VIS, courts and legislatures ensure
that the imposition of the death penalty is a product of reasoned
justice, not a result of "vigilante justice" administered by the jury.
Reasoned and deliberate decision-making, which is mandated by
the Due Process Clause, occurs when relevant and noninflamma-
tory facts are presented to the jury about the individual defendant
and the criminal act. The judge instructs the jury to apply this
information to the statutory law in reaching its verdict of life im-
prisonment or death. VIS have therefore been excluded to pro-
tect the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights to a fair
(quoting ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-10-2, 17-10-30 (1992) (jury must find statutorily based aggravating circumstance
before recommending death sentence but need not find mitigating circumstances).
"' See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (stating jury discretion regulated within objective statutory
standards).
08 LA. CONST. art. 1, § 20.
6 See, e.g., LA. SuP. CT. R. 28 § 1 (West 1992). "Every sentence of death shall be re-
viewed by this court to determine if it is excessive. In determining whether the sentence is
excessive the court shall determine: a) whether the sentence was imposed under the influ-
ence of passion, prejudice of any other arbitrary factors . I..." Id.; see also State v. Brogdan,
457 So. 2d 616, 626 (La. 1984) (declaring that the court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
28, must review each capital sentence to determine if the jury's determination was
reasonable).
"0 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987). The Booth Court stated that "[t]he
focus of a VIS, however, is not on the defendant, but on the character and reputation of
the victim and the effect on his family. These factors may be wholly unrelated to the
blameworthiness of a particular defendant." Id.
" See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor observed, "If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's
remark so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the de-
fendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
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trial, and to prevent sentencing under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or arbitrary factors."
My response is two-fold: First, I do not concede that VIS impose an
impermissible risk of arbitrariness. VIS are but one piece of evidence
among dozens or more which are often introduced to mitigate the guilty
party's conduct. "Victim impact evidence is simply another form or
method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm
caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long consid-
ered by sentencing authorities." "7 Moreover, ifa family member is a fact
witness, as I was, the jury has already been exposed to some of the infor-
mation in the VIS during the guilt phase of the trial. Finally, the due
process protections present throughout the defendant's trial remain in
full effect; any sentence imposed arbitrarily will be reversed.7 4 The possi-
bility that the evidence may be inflammatory does not warrant a per se
bar to any evidence labelled VIS." Additionally, to the extent that VIS
are inflammatory, they are often made so by the circumstances of the
crime-a fact which should not be used against the victim, the only party
who truly had no control.7
My second response is far more personal, but no less relevant: There
can be no more arbitrary sentence of death than that imposed on my wife.
Unlike her murderer, my wife, Beth, has no appeal or constitutional
right of review of her death sentence.77 There was no jury who dispas-
sionately and rationally determined her sentence; there was only one
7' See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811-12 (1989) (excluding victim impact
evidence); Booth, 482 U.S. at 505-06 (same).
7 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
7' See id. at 2608. "In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial
that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides a mechanism for relief." Id. (citations omitted).
"" See id. at 2612. (Souter, J., concurring). "Trial courts routinely exclude evidence that
is unduly inflammatory; where inflammatory evidence is improperly admitted, appellate
courts carefully review the record to determine whether the error was prejudicial." Id.
" See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor recognized that the brief testi-
mony of the victim's mother, albeit moving, "did not inflame [the jurors'] passions more
than did the facts of the crime." Id.
"' The defendant's due process protections are firmly established in both stages of a
bifurcated trial and, more importantly, in post-trial proceedings. The Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that the "Supreme Court of Louisiana shall review every sen-
tence of death to determine if it is excessive. The court rules shall establish such proce-
dures as are necessary to satisfy constitutional criteria for review." LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992). Pursuant to article 905.9, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court enacted rule 28 to provide judicial review of every sentence of death to en-
sure its fairness. LA. SuP. CT. RULE 28 (West 1992); see also supra note 69 (discussing Rule
28).
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man who decided her fate, and with it, my own.
C. The Defendant Has No Control Over and is Likely Unaware of the
Personal Circumstances of the Victim
Another reason to exclude VIS at capital sentencing hearings is
that the characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact to
the family are, in most cases, unintended or unknown by the de-
fendant and, thus, do not factor into a defendant's moral blame-
worthiness.7 8 The Booth Court warned that the admission of VIS
would permit the jury to hand down a death sentence based upon
the social status of the victim.7 9 Only those victims and victims'
families who are able to articulate their grief, either orally or in
writing, will "benefit" from the use of victim impact statements.8
Those victims and families who cannot articulate their thoughts
and feelings because of a lack of education, or financial or social
status will not have the same impact at sentencing.8 This allows
for a defendant to be more harshly sentenced based on the social
worth or perceived "value" of the victim. Considerations of the
social position of the victim are irrelevant factors in deciding who
should be punished and who is more blameworthy. Social stratifi-
cation of victims runs contrary to our constitutional notions of
due process and fundamental fairness, especially in death penalty
cases.
It is not a violation of a defendant's rights whether one victim can artic-
ulate their grief better than another. When a defendant takes a life, he is
fully responsible for taking an innocent person's life, which necessarily
includes culpability for denying that victim's role in society. This is anal-
ogous to the tort maxim: "You take your victim as you find him." 82
Furthermore, the statement, from the Booth decision, that the defend-
ant has no control over and is likely unaware of the personal circum-
stances of the victim ignores the defendant's concededly knowing and in-
" See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1989) (observing that victim impact
evidence introduces factors which defendants were typically unaware or were irrelevant to
defendant's decision to kill).
Id. at 506.
I ld. at 505-06.
81 Id.
Feyerabend v. Dep't of Wildlife, 544 So. 2d 577, 583 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Mouton v.
Dominique, 476 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
[Vol. 8:35
VICTIMS' VOICES
tentional decision to murder.88 As Justice Souter explained,
[m]urder has foreseeable consequences. When it happens, it
is always to distinct individuals, and after it happens other
victims are left behind. Every defendant knows, if endowed
with the mental competence for criminal responsibility, that
the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a
unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed
probably has close associates, "survivors," who will suffer
harms and deprivations from the victim's death. . . . Thus,
when a defendant chooses to kill, or to raise the risk of a
victim's death, this choice necessarily relates to a whole
human being and threatens an association of others, who may
be distinctly hurt. The fact that the defendant may not know
the details of a victim's life and characteristics, or the exact
identities and needs of those who may survive, should not in
any way obscure the further facts that death is always to a
"unique" individual, and harm to some group of survivors is
a consequence of a successful homicidal act so foreseeable as
to be virtually inevitable."
The full impact of murder is foreseeable-therefore, "evidence of the spe-
cific harm caused when a homicidal risk is realized is nothing more than
evidence of the risk that the defendant originally chose to run despite the
kinds of consequences that were obviously foreseeable." 85
D. Sentence of Death is Unique and Irreversible
The imposition of a death sentence is the ultimate, irreversible
punishment.86 Consequently, when a defendant is sentenced to
death, the Supreme Court correctly mandates that "it should be
as a result of a decision based on reason and reliable evidence."87
Because capital punishment denies a defendant of his life, not just
liberty or property, the process is carefully circumscribed by legis-
lative enactments. 88 By statute, sentencing juries must consider
88 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
Payne v. Tennessee, 11, S. Ct. 2597, 2615-16 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (per curiam).
87 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2614 (citing Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir.
1982)).
Because the death penalty is irrevocable, the cases and sentencing procedures merit
different considerations and solid constitutional protections. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (" '[flor the determination of sentences, justice generally requires...
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both mitigating and aggravating circumstances at the sentencing
hearing. 9 Admissibility standards for introducing relevant miti-
gating evidence are often generously applied by judges; con-
versely, courts have curtailed the admission of aggravating cir-
cumstances to those specifically mandated by statute to protect the
defendant's due process rights and avoid the introduction of
highly inflammatory evidence."' The scope of admissible mitigat-
ing evidence appropriately tips the scales in favor of ensuring that
all of the defendant's constitutional rights are afforded before the
irreversible punishment of death is carried out.
Only death is irreversible.91 No one understands this better than me,
and those like me, who must live without a loved one who has been mur-
dered. Few can grasp the emotional injury and magnitude of the loss.
For me, the aching void and the numbness inside my heart, the sorrow
and anguish of my wife's murder will shadow me for the rest of my life.
As a result of Booth and Gathers, victims who survive crimes have
greater rights than those victims who lose their lives, which is the most
precious of all "possessions." Because VIS are inadmissible in Louisiana
capital cases, murder victims are silenced in every respect. " 'Murder is
the ultimate act of depersonalization.' It transforms a living person with
hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is
special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude
a State from deciding to give some of that back." 92
E. The Risk of a Mini-Trial of Irrebuttable Evidence
Due process attaches only to the defendant who is on trial, not
that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the charac-
ter and propensities of the offender.' ") (citations omitted)); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
271 (1976) ("A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not
only why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.");
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976) (state statute found unconstitutional for
failing to provide jury with proper standards determining when death penalty is appropri-
ate and "little or no evidence concerning the personal characteristics and previous record
of an individual defendant").
"0 See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 905 (West 1992). "Following a verdict of guilty in a
capital case, a sentence of death may be imposed only after a sentencing hearing as pro-
vided herein." The statutes include a specific list of aggravating circumstances, LA. CODE
CRIM. PRoc. art. 905.4 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992), and mitigating circumstances, LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 905.5. (West 1984 & Supp. 1992), to be considered by the jury.
" See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97.
" The capital defendant has the right to appeal within the state court system and also
the limited right to appeal pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts.
91 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to the victim or to the victim's family. Overriding constitutional
due process concerns arise for the defendant in a capital case who
is denied an adequate opportunity to rebut the potentially inflam-
matory victim impact statements. Without the opportunity to re-
but, the focus on the sentencing hearing may unconstitutionally
shift from the defendant to the victim and family members.9 3
Given the uniqueness of the death penalty, courts must be vigilant
to ensure that the defendant's procedural due process rights and
Eighth Amendment rights are protected at all stages, especially at
the sentencing phase.
As discussed earlier, much of the VIS is admitted during the guilt
phase and is often overshadowed by the steady stream of mitigating evi-
dence introduced by the guilty defendant.9' Moreover, the mitigating evi-
dence presented by the defendant is often irrebuttable; for example, the
testimony regarding the defendant's positive character, attitude, and be-
havior is difficult to disprove. In Payne, Mr. Payne's parents and a
friend testified that he did not abuse drugs or alcohol, that he loved
children, and that he was a good person.9" Where is the balance?
F. Evidence Must Be Limited to the Defendant and the Circumstances
of the Crime
Imposition of a death sentence clearly must be based on rele-
vant information. Booth and Gathers established that the sentenc-
ing jury may hear evidence that relates directly to the nature of the
crime.97 The jury may also decide whether to impose a sentence of
life or death based upon the character of the defendant." VIS do not
meet either of these criteria. Moreover, prior to the Payne deci-
sion, the Supreme Court acknowledged that VIS do not qualify as
evidence related to the "circumstances of the offense."'9 9 Even the
Payne decision recognized that only certain types of VIS can be
admissible without violating the Eighth Amendment. 00 Personal
" See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-06 (1989). "The focus of a VIS, however, is
not on the defendant, but on the character and reputation of the victim and in effect on his
family." Id. at 504.
" Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. "In many cases the evidence relating to the victim is already
before the jury at least in part because of its relevance at the guilt phase of the trial." Id.
,' Id. at 2602-03.
See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10.
98 See id. at 502.
99 Id. at 504.
100 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 n.2 (1991) (admitting VIS relating to
1992]
52 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
statements of surviving family members regarding what should
happen to the defendant at sentencing and characterizations
about the crime (as well as the defendant) are presently inadmissi-
ble.10 1 The distinction painstakingly drawn by the Court between
types of VIS implicitly recognizes the danger of admitting VIS,
demonstrates that VIS are inherently unrelated to the "circum-
stances of the crime," and should therefore be held inadmissible.
Proper punishment requires a full assessment of the criminal conduct:
"noxiae poena par esto!" 102 This assessment includes not only the de-
fendant's character and the circumstances of the crime, but it must also
reflect the harm caused to society. Society's collective judgment of the
harm caused by specific conduct forms the basis for our criminal justice
system. 103 For each crime, certain conduct is enumerated and the degree
of the harm reflected by the range of applicable sentences. Society has
similarly assessed the loss in terms of the type of victim murdered. Vic-
tims under 12 years old and peace officers, for example are treated dif-
ferently than others. Their unique personal characteristics are relevant.
In Louisiana, the defendant who kills someone under 12 years old may
be sentenced to death-regardless of whether the defendant was aware of
the person's age.'04 "[C]riminal conduct has traditionally been catego-
rized and penalized differently according to consequences not specifically
intended, but determined in part by conditions unknown to a defendant
when he acted." 105
G. Sifting Evidence to Ensure Due Process
The victim, and the victim's family, are an integral part of the
criminal justice process. Nevertheless, the victim's perspective is
limited by the courts to preserve the fundamental fairness of the
trial and sentencing process, which includes both aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. At the sentencing phase, the court has
discretion to consider a wide range of information. States may not
exclude any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant prof-
victim and impact on family, but excluding characterizations about that crime, defendant
and appropriate sentence).
101 Id. at 2611 n.2.
"Let the punishment match the offense."
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605. "[L]egislatures [grade] the severity of crimes in accor-
dance with the harm done by the criminal." Id.
104 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1986).
100 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring).
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fers in support of a sentence less than death.'" 6 However, the
court must take steps to curtail prejudicial and passionate deci-
sion-making by the jury. Constitutional protections, and exclusion
of some evidence, is integral to the judicial process and must be
enforced. Admittedly, this may leave the victim's family frustrated
and isolated from full participation in the process. Nonetheless,
the court has a constitutional mandate to balance the defendant's
personally attached constitutional rights against the victim's inter-
est in the criminal justice process.
"States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant cir-
cumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty." 107 The
state "must allow it to consider any relevant information offered by the
defendant." '08 As the Court recognized in Payne, this unfairly weights
"the scales in a capital trial" in favor of a defendant1 0 9 Payne also
presented an excellent (and typical) example of the system's potential un-
fairness under Booth and its progeny:
The capital sentencing jury heard testimony from Payne's
girlfriend that they met at church, that he was affectionate,
caring, kind to her children, that he was not an abuser of
drugs or alcohol, and that it was inconsistent with his charac-
ter to have committed the murders. Payne's parents testified
that he was a good son, and a clinical psychologist testified
that Payne was an extremely polite prisoner and suffered
from a low IQ. None of this testimony was related to the cir-
cumstances of Payne's brutal crimes. In contrast, the only evi-
dence of the impact of Payne's offenses during the sentencing
phase was Nicholas's grandmother's description-in response
to a single question-that the child misses his mother and
baby sister 1 °
My own experience is similar. During the sentencing phase of Green's
trial, my family, Beth's family, and our friends watched and listened
silently to witness after witness who tried to exculpate the man who killed
my wife. We were therefor Beth, but our voices were silenced; we were not
100 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1984) (holding state may not pre-
clude sentencer from considering relevant mitigating evidence).
" McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987).
I08 Id.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
110 Id. at 2608-09.
1992]
54 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
allowed to "breathe" life into her."' Never did the inequity and unfair-
ness cut so deeply-if Beth had survived, it is undisputed that she could
have testified as to who she was and how she was hurt. But when she
died, her rights died with her. In effect, the court rewarded Green for
killing Beth by excluding any testimony that humanized her. The Payne
Court noted this inequity:
[T]here is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in
mind [the] harm at the same time as it considers the mitigat-
ing evidence introduced by the defendant. . . . "[i]t is an af-
front to the civilized members of the human race to say that
at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may
praise the background, character and good deeds of Defend-
ant (as was done in this case), without limitation as to rele-
vancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon the character
of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.' . . . 'J]ustice,
though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to
a filament. We are to keep the balance true." '112
As a victim, I will concede that the criminal justice system demands
neutrality in dispensing justice, but in order to be neutral, the trier of
fact should hear from both the victim of the crime and the accused. I am
not advocating a new form of justice that favors the concerns of the vic-
tim over the constitutionally recognized rights of the defendant. As a vic-
tim and as the voice of a deceased victim, my wife, we demand equal
treatment by providing a limited opportunity to be heard at the sentenc-
ing phase: "All we ask is that we be treated just like a criminal." 113
III. PAYNE AND SUFFERING FOR THE STATES
Following the Payne decision, issues surrounding the admissibil-
ity of VIS in capital cases are determined statutorily or jurispru-
dentially. In adhering to the earlier jurisprudence of Booth and
I The only evidence before the jury during the guilt phase was that the victim was
indeed dead. An overwhelming majority of the testimony regarding the victim was forensic
testimony. The only testimony that related directly to the victim was my testimony during
the guilt phase of the trial that we were married for ten weeks and brief questioning re-
garding our careers. Had I not witnessed this crime my tegtimony would have been
prohibited.
112 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (Car-
dozo, J.)).
118 Marlene A. Young, A Constitutional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims' Per-
spective, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 51, 59 (1987).
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Gathers, several states continue to exclude VIS in noncapital
cases. 14 Consistent with Payne, other states have begun to admit
VIS at the sentencing stage in capital cases. 6 Recently, the Loui-
siana Supreme Court was challenged in State v. Bernard I" to de-
cide whether VIS are admissible during capital sentencing in Lou-
isiana courts.
A. Legislative History
Historically, Louisiana courts excluded VIS at capital sentenc-
ing hearings, " 7 based on the evidentiary ground that VIS lacked
114 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.2 (Harrison 1993) (admitting VIS at sentencing
hearings for felony cases with physical, psychological or economic injury, serious physical
injury or death, unless death penalty or life imprisonment may be imposed); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 1005-4-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (affording victim right to present victim impact
statement in sentencing for violent crimes or drunk driving except in death penalty cases);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-1-7.1 (sentencing considerations shall include VIS), 35-38-1-8 (re-
quiring victim be advised of right to make victim impact statement), 35-38-1-8.5 (VIS ad-
missible at sentencing in felony cases unless capital crime), 35-38-1-9 (presentence investi-
gation may include VIS except in cases where death sentence sought) (West 1986 & Supp.
1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 4B (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (VIS admissible at
sentencing phase of felony cases unless death penalty could be imposed); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-1550 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1992) (VIS admissible in sentencing crimes within
jurisdiction of General Sessions Court unless death penalty sought); see also MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-112 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (excluding VIS in presentence investigation reports
of capital cases).
" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1985 & Supp. 1993) (enumerating aggra-
vating and mitigating factors to be considered in capital sentencing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 651:4-a (permitting victims to speak before sentencing in capital and other enumerated
cases); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 984.1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (admitting written or
oral VIS at sentencing); see also People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 465-67 (Cal. 1991) (hold-
ing VIS admissible in capital sentencing as circumstance of crime), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
125 (1992). Following Payne, other states may either amend sentencing statutes to remove
exclusionary language thereby allowing VIS in capital sentencing, or rely on judicial pro-
nouncements to admit VIS in capital cases consistent with Payne.
"' 608 So. 2d 966 (La. 1992).
M See, e.g., State v. Henry, 198 So. 910 (La. 1940). In Henry, the prosecutor, in addition
to several other highly prejudicial acts, "virtually introduce[d] the widow and daughter
into the evidence before the jury ... and had the benefit of the family's continuous, even
though silent, plea to the jury for the 'hanging verdict.' " Id. at 920. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court cited Swindle v. State, 176 So. 372, 373 (Ala. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 176 So.
375 (Ala. 1937), for the proposition that in trials involving great human interest, judges
must exercise cautious discretion to ensure that no extraneous influences are injected into
the trial process and jury deliberations. Henry, 198 So. at 920-2 1. The Henry court held
that the prosecutor staged an exhibition by pointing to the bereaved wife and daughter of
the victim "when neither one of them took the stand to testify nor could they have done so for
that purpose. . . . These extraneous circumstances and influences were prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused." Id. at 921; see also State v. Broughton, 105 So. 59, 61
(La. 1925) (holding that fact that victim left a family is irrelevant and evidence establishing
that fact inadmissible). But see infra note 141 (citing case law holding that introduction of
victim impact evidence nonreversible error).
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relevance.""
In 1986, Louisiana enacted legislation which specifically ad-
dressed victims' rights. The legislation provided for VIS inclusion
in sentencing defendants "convicted of a felony offense or a mis-
demeanor offense that has been reduced from a felony."" How-
ever, despite these statutory changes authorizing the inclusion of
VIS, prosecutors refrained from introducing VIS at capital sen-
tencing fearing that to do so would constitute grounds for subse-
quent reversal.
One year later, in 1987, the Booth opinion erected a per se con-
stitutional bar against victims' statements at capital sentencing
hearings. Moreover, in 1989, Booth's prohibition against the vic-
tim's statement at capital sentencing was extended by Gathers to
the prosecutor. Amid this exclusionary milieu, Louisiana amended
its VIS statutory language in 1989. The result was that the lan-
guage of the statute was changed to provide that VIS could be
included in sentencing persons "convicted of an offense other
than a capital offense."'2 0 Since the Booth prohibition against VIS
admissibility in capital sentencing was in effect at that time, it ap-
pears that the legislature could not have expanded the scope of
the statute to expressly include the introduction of VIS at capital
sentencing hearings. Rather, it seems clear that the language was
changed to bring Louisiana's capital sentencing scheme into com-
pliance with constitutional constraints.
However, Booth and Gathers were overruled by Payne in 1991.
Consequently, interpretation of Louisiana's statutory scheme spe-
cifically requiring VIS admissibility at felony sentencing hear-
ings' 2 ' except capital sentencing hearings 2 was ambiguous. Capi-
118 See supra note 117.
119 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 875(A)(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992); see LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 46:1844(A)(9)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992). The statement may be written or oral, and
made by the victim, his family, or the district attorney, or all of them. Id. It shall include
the victim's name, the net financial loss due to the crime, and a psychological impact state-
ment reflecting the victim's welfare. Id. This statutory provision overlaps with the proce-
dures provided in LA. CODE CRIM. PRoC. art. 875(B) (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (requiring
court to order victim impact statement).
20 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 875(A)(1). The legislature rewrote the initial language of
the first sentence of this section in 1986 and then revised it again in 1989, substituting
"convicted of a felony offense or a misdemeanor offense that has been reduced from a
felony" for "convicted of an offense other than a capital offense, for which the punishment
may be imprisonment for more than six months, or if a defendant is convicted of a second
or subsequent misdemeanor." Act 1989, No. 16, § 1.
... See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 875(B):
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tal defendants could argue that the statutory language which
mandates VIS admissibility, except in capital sentencing, excludes
VIS admissibility in capital sentencing. Prosecutors could argue
that the same statutory language does not prevent VIS admissibil-
ity and was modified to its current form in response to the over-
ruled Booth rationale.
Because of the resultant statutory ambiguity a bill was intro-
duced in June 1992, which would have amended the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure "to allow for the introduction of vic-
tim impact evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial."1'2 The
legislative committee voted to take no action on the proposal, ef-
fectively blocking the amendment.
This left the Louisiana state courts with the problem of inter-
preting VIS admissibility in light of statutes which had been en-
acted within the exclusionary milieu created by Booth and Gathers,
but which now had to be applied in the non-exclusionary environ-
ment created by Payne. Faced with this uncertainty, in 1992, the
Louisiana Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of State v. Ber-
nard 124 to decide the admissibility of victim impact testimony in
capital sentencing.
B. Judicial Determination of Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence
In Bernard, the defendant was indicted for first degree murder
If a defendant is convicted or pleads guilty to an offense involving a victim, the court
shall require that a victim impact statement be included in the presentence report.
The victim impact statement shall include factual information as to whether the vic-
tim or his family has suffered, as a result of the offense, any monetary loss, medical
expense, physical impairment, and any other information deemed relevant. The dis-
trict attorney may also file a victim impact statement with the court.Id.
d*2 See LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. arts. 871-892.3 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (General Sen-
tencing Provisions); Id. arts. 905-905.9 (Sentencing in Capital Cases); LA. REV. SrAT. ANN.
§§ 46:1841-44 (West 1992) (Rights of Crime Victims).
The capital sentencing statute provides for introduction of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances in the sentencing phase. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 905.4 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1992) (aggravating circumstances); art. 905.5 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (mitigating
circumstances). The capital sentencing code states specifically that the "sentencing hearing
shall focus on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the of-
fender." LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 905.2 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
Relevant "circumstances of the offense" include evidence of the particular event and the
defendant's role in the criminal act. Id.
121 S. 337, Reg. Sess. (1992), introduced by Senator Saunders (SRS 92-919) June 16,
1992.
12 608 So. 2d 966 (La. 1992).
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for striking the victim several times on the head with a pipe dur-
ing an armed robbery. 2 5 Prior to trial, the prosecutor notified the
defense of his intention to introduce victim impact testimony dur-
ing the sentencing phase, but did not specify in the record the
exact evidence he planned to introduce. 12 6
The trial court held that victim impact evidence was inadmissi-
ble, reasoning that the Louisiana capital sentencing statute de-
mands a focus only on the "circumstances of the offense and char-
acter and propensities of the offender. 1 2 7 Thus, inclusion of
victim impact evidence was outside the statutory scope.128 The
prosecutor applied for, and was granted, supervisory writs by the
court of appeal, which reversed the trial court, stating that:
"Payne does not require the existence of a statute specifically au-
thorizing the admission of such evidence in order for the evidence
to be admitted. Because victim impact evidence comprises part of
the 'circumstances of the offense,' such evidence would be admis-
sible during the capital phase of a capital trial . "..."I'9
Because of the reversal and conflicting case law, the Louisiana
Supreme Court granted certiorari s to determine whether Louisi-
ana's capital sentencing statute authorized the use of victim im-
pact evidence and, similarly, whether the statute, as applied by the
trial court was unconstitutional under the federal and state
constitutions.
Under the Louisiana capital sentencing statute, the outer limits
of admissibility of evidence proffered by the prosecution borders
on that evidence which is relevant to the circumstances of the
murder, or to the character and propensities of the murderer. 131
In allowing only evidence which is relevant to the circumstances
of the crime, the Louisiana statute is narrower than the Tennes-
see statute scrutinized in Payne, which allowed admission of any
evidence "relevant to the punishment.91 3 2
The Bernard court based their examination of the admissibility
of VIS at capital sentencing on relevance. They summarily as-
125 See id. at 967.
126 Id.
121 Id. (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 905.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992)).
128 See Bernard, 608 So. 2d at 967.
129 State v. Bernard, No. 92-KK-0997, slip op. at I (La. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1992).
130 596 So. 2d 541 (La. 1992).
'1 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 905.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
132 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c) (1982).
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serted that the Booth dissenters conceded that a victim's survivors'
opinions about the crime and the murderer are unquestionably
irrelevant to any issue pursuant to a capital sentencing hearing.33
However, the court then deliberated to decide whether the char-
acter of the victim, the impact of the murder on the victim's fam-
ily, and the character and propensities of the offender were rele-
vant to the circumstances of the offense."" Having examined
Justice Souter's concurrence in Payne,'33 the Bernard court agreed
with his reasoning that a murderer with specific intent either
knew, or reasonably should have foreseen, some of the repercus-
sions of his victim's death, and that this general knowledge at the
instant of the crime should be a fact bearing on the murderer's
moral culpability.'3 6 To this extent, the court stated that victim
impact evidence was relevant both to the circumstances of the
crime and to the murderer's character and propensities." 7
"[T]he prosecutor, within the bounds of relevance under the
statute, may introduce a limited amount of general evidence pro-
viding identity to the victim and . . . demonstrating the harm
done to the victim's survivors."'38 The Bernard court further
133 See State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 970-71 (La. 1992). But see Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496, 518-19 (1987) (White, J., dissenting):
To the extent that the Court determines that in this case it was inappropriate to
allow the victims' family to express their opinions on, for example, whether peti-
tioner could be rehabilitated, that is obviously not an inherent fault in all victim
impact statements and no reason to declare the practice of admitting such state-
ments at capital sentencing hearings per se unconstitutional.
Id.; see also id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
To require, as we have, that all mitigating factors which render capital punish-
ment a harsh penalty in the particular case be placed before the sentencing author-
ity, while simultaneously requiring, as we do today, that evidence of much of the
human suffering the defendant has inflicted be suppressed, is in effect to prescribe a
debate on the appropriateness of the capital penalty with one side muted. If that
penalty is constitutional, as we have repeatedly said it is, it seems to me not remotely
unconstitutional to permit both the pros and the cons in the particular case to be
heard.
Id. at 520-21.
I" State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 971 (La. 1992).
13 Id. at 969-70.
186 Id. at 972.
187 Id.
I" Id. at 971. The statute referred to by the court was article 905.2 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure, which limited the admissibility of evidence presented by the
prosecution at capital sentencing to evidence relevant to "the circumstances of the murder
or to the character and propensities of the murderer." Id. at 970 (quoting LA. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. art. 905.2). "Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. (quoting LA. CODE. EvID. art.
1992]
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noted that the more detailed the evidence relating to the charac-
ter of the victim or the harm to the survivors, the less relevant
such information was with regard to the circumstances of the
crime and the character and propensities of the defendant."3 9 The
court likened victim impact evidence to a double-edged sword:
"the more marginal the relevance of the victim impact evidence,
the greater is the risk that an arbitrary factor will be injected into
the jury's sentencing deliberations. '1 40
Reconciling its prior jurisprudence with the Payne decision,"4
the Bernard court fashioned the following guidelines for Louisiana
trial courts to apply to the issue of the admissibility of VIS during
the sentencing phase of a capital trial: "[S]ome evidence of the
murder victim's character and of the impact of the murder on the
victim's survivors is admissible as relevant to the circumstances of
401).
109 See State v. Bernard, 680 So. 2d 966, 972 (La. 1992).
140 Id. at 971. But see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 905.9 (West 1992); LA. SuP. CT. R. 28
(requiring Supreme Court to review every death sentence to determine whether sentence
imposed under influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor).
14 See Bernard, 608 So. 2d at 971-72. In State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240 (La. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980), the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to reverse a death
sentence on the grounds, inter alia, that the victim's wife had testified at the sentencing
phase that her husband's death had left her alone and with the burden of supporting their
two children. Id. at 244. Defense counsel objected to the prosecution asking the victim's
widow how many children she had. Id. The objection was sustained after the witness's re-
sponse was entered in the record. Id. On appeal, defendant assigned the sustaining of the
objection by his own counsel as error. Id.
The same court, in State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 619 (La. 1980), held that the mere fact
that the victim's wife took the stand during the sentencing phase and told the jury that the
victim had been a faithful, loving, and loyal husband for nineteen years, supporting her
and their three children (despite being partially paralyzed), did not inject enough arbitrari-
ness in the sentencing phase to warrant reversal of the defendant's death sentence. See id.
at 625 (citing Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240).
Finally, in State v. Rushing, 464 So. 2d 268 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153
(1986), sentence vacated sub. nor Rushing v. Butler, 868 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1989), the prose-
cutor proffered four witnesses at the sentencing hearing who expressed their various opin-
ions on the appropriateness of the death penalty for the defendant. Id. at 275. The court
held that such evidence should be prohibited; however, the court refused to reverse the
jury's sentence, finding the witnesses' testimony to be harmless error. Id. at 275-76. In
failing to reverse the defendant's death sentence the court stated:
[The victim's aunt] did not express an unqualified opinion that the defendant should
be sentenced to death, but stated: "My mother always told me that vengeance is
mine sayeth the Lord. But I also believe in an eye for an eye." . . . Considering no
witness expressed an unqualified opinion that defendant should be sentenced to
death and four of the witnesses stated he should not be sentenced to death, we do
not believe nor are we of the opinion that . . . [the victim's aunt's] testimony stand-
ing alone injected an arbitrary factor such that it influenced the jury to return with a
death sentence.
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the offense or to the character and propensities of the of-
fender."142 However, the court qualified this general rule by stat-
ing that "detailed descriptions of the good qualities of the victim
or particularized narrations of the emotional, psychological and
economic sufferings of the victim's survivors" promotes the possi-
bility of arbitrariness in the jury's sentencing deliberations and
"treads dangerously" close to the possibility of reversible error. 143
In 1985, the Louisiana Legislature enacted a comprehensive system of
rights of crime victims to remedy the inequities of the current criminal
law system. In its statement of legislative intent, the Legislature explicitly
recognized the importance of citizen cooperation to law enforcement ef-
forts and the overall effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice
system. 144
The Legislature made its intent clear: the voice of the victim must be
heard and their rights "vigorously" protected.1 45 This stated intent mir-
rors the majority's reasoning in Payne. The victims' rights Chapter ap-
plies to all felony cases and mandates that the court must notify the vic-
tim of her right to submit VIS. 146 Moreover, those rights which accrue to
the victim also accrue to the family of homicide victims. 1 47
In addition to the 1985 victims' rights statute, in 1989 the Louisiana
Legislature amended Louisiana's general sentencing procedures. 1 48 This
amendment can be interpreted as another legislative enactment reinforc-
ing victims' rights and permitting the use of VIS in capital sentencing
M Bernard, 608 So. 2d at 972.
143 Id.
114 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1841 (West 1992).
In recognition of the civic and moral duty of victims of crime to cooperate fully and
voluntarily with law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, and in further recogni-
tion of the continuing importance of such citizen cooperation to state and local law
enforcement efforts and the general effectiveness and well-being of the criminal jus-
tice system of this state, the legislature declares its intent, in this Chapter, to ensure
that all victims of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity,
and that the rights extended in this Chapter to victims of crime are honored and
protected by the law enforcement, agencies, prosecutors, and judges in a manner no
less vigorous than the protection afforded the criminal defendants.
Id.
'145 Id. The victim's rights must be protected "in a manner no less vigorous than the
protection afforded criminal defendants." Id.
148 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(A)(9) (West 1992). "Before disposition or sentenc-
ing in any case where a defendant has been charged with or found guilty of a felony, the
court shall notify the victim of the time and place of sentencing and of the victim's right to
make a victim's impact statement." Id. (emphasis added).
"4 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(C) (West 1992). "The family members of all homicide
victims shall be afforded all of the rights under this Section accruing to victims." Id.
"' Act 1989, No. 16, § 1 (amending LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 875(A) (West 1992)).
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cases.
The 1989 legislative amendments permit a judge to order a pre-sen-
tence investigation (PSI) report in certain cases. 49 Once the judge has
ordered a PSI, the inclusion of a victim impact statement in the PSI is
mandatory.5 The amendment focused on the types of cases in which
PSI, and accompanying VIS are admissible. Specifically, the legislature
changed the language of the statute from "convicted of an offense other
than a capital offense, for which the punishment may be imprisonment
for more than six months, or if a defendant is convicted of a second or
subsequent misdemeanor," to "convicted of a felony offense or a misde-
meanor offense that has been reduced from a felony." 151 Thus, PSI re-
ports may be ordered and victim impact statements are admissible in all
felony cases. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure defines the term
"felony" as "an offense that may be punished by death or by imprison-
ment at hard labor." 152 Thus, victim impact statements are admissible
in capital cases pursuant to the statutory authority of article 875.5'
IV. CONCLUSION
The exclusion of VIS "deprives the State of the full moral force
of its evidence and may prevent the jury from having before it all
the information necessary to determine the proper punishment
for a first-degree murder."" 4 "The violation of a law is not only an
offense against society, but is also an invasion of the personal rights of
the victim. " 55
Arguably, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized that
government has a duty to protect its citizens. However, the government
,0 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 875(A)(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992):
If a defendant is convicted of a felony offense or a misdemeanor offense that has
been reduced from a felony, the court may order.., a presentence investigation...
• In making the investigation, the probation officer shall inquire into the circum-
stances attending the commission of the offense, the defendant's history of delin-
quency or criminality, his family situation and background, economic and employ-
ment status, education, and personal habits.
Id.
I" LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 875(B) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992). "If a defendant is con-
victed or pleads guilty to an offense involving a victim, the court shall require that a victim
impact statement be included in the presentence report." Id. (emphasis added).
'1 See supra note 149 (quoting art. 875 (A)(1) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure).
'6' LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 933(3) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992).
'6 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 875(B) (West 1984 & Supp. 1992).
'14 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608 (1991).
158 Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right
Not To Be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 65 (1984).
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has a duty to give full and efficient protection to the rights of all of its
citizens. The rights protected by the Due Process Clause should include
my rights and my wife's rights, as well as her murderer's rights. "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individ-
ual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.
One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.' 156 So
long as courts impose little or no restriction on the admissibility of miti-
gating evidence, then justice and equity demand that the victim have a
voice at least in the sentencing procedure.1
57
The need for parity, fairness, and justice results from the Court's ear-
lier decisions granting the defendant carte blanche in presenting mitigat-
ing evidence, evidence which is often irrelevant to the crime. Under this
system, the silence of the victim's voice never rang so loudly. The victim
and her family were denied their "day in court" by the exclusion of VIS.
The victim once again feels victimized, but this time by the criminal jus-
tice system. Ultimately, this frustration and feeling of powerlessness will
undermine society's overall confidence in the judicial process.
A reasonable compromise is possible in admitting mitigating ev-
idence and VIS aggravating circumstances. We acknowledge that
the second type of Booth evidence is irrelevant (family's comments
on the crime and the appropriate sentence). Regarding the first
type of Booth evidence (personal characteristics of the victim and
the impact upon the victim's family), we propose a revised system
of restraint for Louisiana and all states: the convicted defendant
should not be allowed to introduce tangentially related witnesses
who testify to his good character. The trial judge shall exercise
discretion in deciding which witnesses are relevant to the sentenc-
ing proceedings and the defendant reserves his right to appeal. At
the same time, a limited amount of VIS should be admissible at
the capital sentencing hearing. Courts should allow testimony or
written statements regarding the impact of the crime on the vic-
tim's immediate family along with information about the victim's
personal characteristics. The trial judge shall limit VIS to brief
and unemotional statements to minimize the risk of prejudice to
the defendant.' 5 The VIS shall not be lengthy nor highly emo-
' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
See Payne, 1II S. Ct. at 2609 (discussing unfairness of admitting mitigating evidence
of defendant's character while excluding evidence of harm imposed on victims).
' See Craig E. Gilmore, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Rejection of Precedent, Recognition of
Victim Impact Worth, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 469, 486-87 (1992) (discussing means employed by
1992]
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tional.'6 9 If the judge, or the attorneys, believe that the victim im-
pact testimony is likely to be highly emotional and inflammatory,
the judge may require that the VIS be submitted in writing prior
to the trial. Both sides shall have an opportunity to review the VIS
and excise sections that are inflammatory or irrelevant to the sen-
tencing decision. In this post-Payne constitutional quandary, the
Louisiana courts and other states legitimately seek to protect the
capital defendant's constitutional rights and at the same time to
strike a compromise to acknowledge victims' roles in the criminal
justice process, because in the end, "[r]igid justice is the greatest
injustice." 6 0
state courts to avoid Booth and Gathers rule forbidding use of victim impact information);
see also People v. Stankewitz, 793 P.2d 23, 49 (Cal. 1990) (in bank) (holding "brief and
mild" prosecution remarks on victim's death harmless), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1432 (1991);
People v. Lewis, 786 P.2d 892, 905 (Cal. 1990) (refusing VIS and recognizing judge's role
to strike balance between probative and prejudicial evidence).
1"' See State v. Kills on Top, 793 P.2d 1273, 1305-06 (Mont. 1990) (upholding findings
of sentencing court), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2910 (1991).
'" THOMAS FULLER, GNOMOLOGIA (1732).
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